DOE inspector finds no evidence of cheating, but questions testimony

Federal investigators found no evidence that WSI Oak Ridge tried to cheat on a test at the Y-12 National Security Comple this summer, but they also questioned the credibility of contractors who testified that there was no intent to cheat.

A copy of the test was found in a WSI Oak Ridge patrol vehicle on Aug. 29, one day before it was scheduled to be given to security guards. It was part of an inspection by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Health, Safety and Security that followed the July 28 security breach at Y-12.

In a special report this month, U.S. Department of Energy Inspector General Gregory H. Friedman said the test, as well as answers to test questions, had been distributed to many WSI Oak Ridge employees, including captains, lieutenants, and security police officers, “the very people whose knowledge was to have been evaluated.” At best, Friedman said, the transmission, review, and distribution of the test demonstrated a lack of due care and negligence.

“The failure to properly safeguard the test prior to its administration, especially given the intense focus on Y-12 and the security concerns at the site, was, in our opinion, inexplicable and inexcusable,” Friedman wrote in an Oct. 26 memo included in the 14-page special report, which is available online.

Y-12 and its security guards were under scrutiny when the test was found in August because three anti-nuclear weapons protesters had cut through fences at the plant in July and splashed blood and spray-painted slogans on a building where bomb-grade uranium is stored.

Friedman said the test had been labeled and initially distributed by encrypted e-mail to “trusted agents.” But WSI Oak Ridge officials treated the document as if it were a training aid, mentioning its receipt at daily supervisor meetings and distributing it to officers. The e-mail did not contain specific instructions for protecting the test, Friedman said.

He said federal inspectors had expected that testing materials would normally be withheld from the entity being tested.

“We learned that such was not the case in the Y-12 situation,” Friedman said.

The federal security official at Y-12 who was provided the test for review and comment said it was not his role to provide input. HSS officials told the IG that federal security officials often lack the detailed knowledge required to check contractor testing materials, so they are sent to contractors.

“As a consequence, a senior security representative of the contractor was placed in a position of reviewing and providing comments on a knowledge test designed to evaluate its own performance,” the IG report said.

But Friedman said federal officials should have an active role in reviewing, commenting, and controlling testing materials.

“The use of contractors is not an optimal situation and, if necessary because of gaps in coverage by federal officials, should be minimized and tightly controlled,” he said.

The IG report said HSS initially sent the test in an e-mail to B&W and the National Nuclear Security Administration Production Office, or NPO. They were asked to review it. B&W then forwarded the e-mail to a WSI Oak Ridge manager, asking for comment.

The WSI manager had not been designated a “trusted agent,” and he or she forwarded the e-mail to two other protective force officers, neither of whom were trusted agents.

The distribution by contractor management officials set the stage for the eventual compromise of the test, Friedman said.

“By the next day, the test material appears to have lost its identity, and widespread distribution began,” he said.

Friedman said the document was clearly marked as a test, but WSI Oak Ridge supervisors told federal inspectors that they had not noticed the document header, which carried the label “Y-12 Protective Force Test Key.”

“We found this purported lack of attention not to be credible,” Friedman said.

Friedman said the contractor governance system at Y-12 failed to prevent the compromise of the test, which had to be postponed and rewritten. The NNSA, however, did not agree that its “implementation of the governance process was a contributory cause of the knowledge test compromise,” Friedman said.

WSI Oak Ridge has since lost its contract to provide more than 500 security guards at Y-12. Also known as Wackenhut and G4S Government Solutions, the company had provided the protective force at Y-12 for more than a decade.

The company, which continues to guard other DOE sites in Oak Ridge, has said its employees did not intend to do anything wrong when the Y-12 test questions were distributed.

B&W Y-12, which manages and operates Y-12 for the NNSA, is now responsible for providing the security guards.

The IG report included three recommendations. It said DOE directives should be updated to clearly define when trusted agents should be used, procedures should be revised so testing materials are properly marked and protected, and the authorities and responsibilities of federal oversight officials should be clarified.

It said HSS has updated its internal procedures to ensure documents are clearly marked, the use of “trusted agents” is better defined and communicated, and the office began using e-mail encryption that required receipt acknowledgement and prevented e-mails from being forwarded.